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We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on incumbency advantages, scale economies and sequential buyers 
(or markets). The prey needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) has an initial advantage 
and is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale the latter needs, thus making monopoly 
profits on later buyers. Several extensions are considered, including cases where scale economies exist because of demand 
externalities or two-sided market effects, and where markets are characterized by common costs. Conditions under which 
predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.  
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Standard models of predatory pricing, i.e. reputation, signalling, and nancial predation models,
rely on information asymmetries to explain why an incumbent rm may have an incentive to
prey upon rivals. For instance, these models assume that the prey is an entrant rm who does
not know the cost of the incumbent, or that external nanciers do not observe the behavior of
the prey once it has obtained outside funds.1;2
In this paper, we present a simple theory of predation which does not depend on information
asymmetries, and which is based instead on the co-existence of scale economies and sequential
buyers (or markets). Intuitively, our mechanism works as follows. In an industry where there
exist scale economies (which can be either on the supply side or the demand side), the incumbent
engages in below-cost pricing to some early buyers (or markets) to deprive the rival of the scale it
needs to operate successfully. Once deprived the rival of key buyers (or markets), the incumbent
will be able to raise prices on the remaining buyers (or markets), thereby recouping losses. The
two usual ingredients of predation, early sacrice of prots followed by later recoupment, are
therefore present in our theory as well.
In our model, the incumbent may exclude a more ecient rival even if the latter can approach
buyers and submit bids at the same time as the incumbent. It is the interaction between scale
economies and an incumbency advantage which makes exclusion possible. To see why, consider
a case where the two rms compete for two new consumers who buy in sequence. Imagine that
the incumbent also serves some non-contestable buyers, who bought from it in the past and are
not willing to switch to another supplier. Instead the rival, who is a recent entrant, has no (or
fewer) captive buyers. Under scale economies, this asymmetry may imply that the incumbent is
more ecient than the rival at supplying one new buyer, even though the rival is more ecient
at supplying both of the new buyers. In turn, this implies that - if for some reason it were
able to secure the rst buyer - the incumbent would be able to extract higher rents than the
rival from the second buyer. Hence, when rms compete for the rst buyer - anticipating that
who secures the rst buyer will also supply the second - there will be two eects at play. On
the one hand, higher overall eciency makes the rival more aggressive; on the other hand, the
perspective of higher rent extraction makes the incumbent more aggressive. We show that if the
(overall) eciency advantage of the rival is not strong enough, then it is the incumbent which
will make the winning bid for the rst buyer. Therefore, predation will arise at the equilibrium
and is welfare detrimental.
Perhaps the simplest setting where to see this mechanism at work is one where the incumbent
has already sunk an entry cost f, while the rival has not, but it has a lower (constant) marginal
cost than the incumbent. Economies of scale imply that entry is protable only if both buyers
1Kreps and Wilson (1982) are the main reference for reputation-based predation models. Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) explain predation through a signalling model, which has later been used by Saloner (1987) to model
predation for takeovers, by Scharfstein (1984) to model test-market predation, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
to show how predation might limit the ability of a new entrant to infer about its protability. See Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990) for a theory which models predation in (imperfect) nancial markets, by putting on rmer
grounds the so-called 'long purse' theory of predation.
2For a discussion on whether real-world cases t the 'story' described by such models, see Bolton, Brodley and
Riordan (2000, 2001) and Elzinga and Mills (2001).
1buy from the entrant. Here, if the incumbent manages to serve the rst buyer, it will extract
monopoly prots from the second buyer (recall that entry is protable only if both buyers are
served), whereas if the entrant serves the rst buyer, it will only make duopoly prots from
serving the second buyer. If the entrant's eciency advantage is small enough, the incumbent
will bid more aggressively for the rst buyer, and predation will take place at equilibrium, with
the prot sacrice on the rst buyer outweighed by the prots made on the second buyer.
We intentionally keep our model as simple and parsimonious as possible, to highlight our
predation mechanism, discuss conditions under which it holds, and show that it can be applied
to several contexts. After presenting the basic model with supply-side scale economies (Section
2), we discuss the robustness of our results in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that predation
may also occur in markets characterized by demand-side scale economies, due for instance to the
existence of network externalities or of two-sided markets. Section 5 will conclude the paper.
The predation mechanism we highlight seems to be present in a number of recent predation
cases that took place in Europe (in the US, after the 1993 Supreme Court judgment in Brooke
Group and the requirement that plaintis prove recoupment, there have been no successful
predatory cases) where both scale economies and strong initial advantages on the side of the
incumbent play an important role. Let us briey review some of these cases.
In May 2009, the European Commission imposed on Intel the highest ne in history (more
than one billion euro), for implementing a strategy aimed at foreclosing competitors from the
market of Central Processing Units for the x86 architecture.3 More particularly, Intel had
awarded rebates (and engaged in other restrictive practices) to major PC manufacturers (OEMs),
and to Media Saturn Holding, Europe's largest PC retailer. According to the EC, these rebates
were below costs, and were motivated by the growing competitive threat that the rival rm
AMD represented for Intel. The EC does not spell out a theory of harm, but the mechanism
we highlight in this paper is consistent with the facts of the case. Intel is strongly dominant
in the relevant market and a vaste proportion of market demand is considered to be non-
contestable, guaranteeing Intel a strong incumbency advantage over AMD. There are signicant
scale economies in the x86 CPU market due to the large sunk costs in R&D and in production
facilities.4 Also, the orders of some buyers seem to be crucial for the success of rivals:
"(T)he Decision also indicates that certain OEMs, and in particular Dell and HP, are strategically
more important than other OEMs in their ability to provide a CPU manufacturer access to the
market. They can be distinguished from other OEMs on the basis of three main criteria: (i) market
share; (ii) strong presence in the more protable part of the market; and (iii) ability to legitimize a
new CPU in the market." (para 32 of the Summary of Commission Decision.)
Finally, it is interesting to note how - similar to the `auction' modelled in our paper - Intel
and AMD were competing in prices for the contestable portion of the market.5
3European Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.990 of 13 May 2009 (Intel).
4See section 3.3 of the Decision. Note that the EC stresses that "... once entry has taken place, a manufacturer's
production capacity is limited by the size of the existing facilities. Expanding output requires additional (sunk)
investment into new property, plant and equipment as well as several years' lead time." (para. 866 of the Decision.)
5For instance, at para 956 of the Decision, there is a reference to AMD competing with, but not being able to
match, Intel's oers: 'AMD was not in a position to oer a compensating rebate of the size required by HP.'
2In 2004 the Italian Antitrust Authority found that Telecom Italia (TI), the public monopolist
before the liberalization process, had abused a dominant position.6 Telecom Italia was found
to set prices in a selective and aggressive way and to engage into cross-subsidization, with the
aim of taking away key customers from its rivals,7 thereby hindering their expansion. There
are no doubts that scale economies are pervasive in telecommunications and that TI had strong
incumbency advantages over new entrants, which still had to build up or fully develop their
infrastructure (viable only if they reached sucient scale) and customer basis.8 Among other
episodes, Telecom Italia was found guilty of price abuses in the 2002 CONSIP auction for
supplying xed and mobile telephony services to the Italian Public Administrations. The fact
that rms competed in the pricing conditions to business customers and that formal tender
auctions existed, also makes this market very similar to the one described in our model.
In November 2008 the UK Oce of Fair Trading (OFT) found that Cardi Bus had infringed
Chapter II of the UK Competition Act 1998 by engaging in predatory conduct.9 In response to
2 Travel's entry into the market with a new no-frills bus service, Cardi Bus introduced its own
no-frills bus service (the 'white service'), running on the same routes and at similar times of day
as 2 Travel's services. The white services were run at a loss until shortly after 2 Travel's exit,
when Cardi Bus discontinued them. In this case as well, scale economies were important both
at the level of single routes (consumers value frequency of services) and at the level of the bus
network (consumers value the combinations of schedules and routes). While Cardi Bus was
the (dominant) incumbent and had already developed a strong network, other bus companies
would have had to incur substantial costs to develop it.
In 2001 the OFT found that Napp, a pharmaceutical company, had contravened Chapter
II of the UK Competition Act 1998 through its behavior in the market for the supply and
distribution of sustained release morphine in the United Kingdom. This infringement involved
both a charge of predatory pricing in the hospital segment and one of excessive pricing in the
community segment (Napp had a market share well in excess of 90% in both segments). While
it may appear odd that Napp could engage in too low prices in a market segment and too
high prices in another market segment, our theory helps interpret the case. Sustained release
morphine was sold to two completely dierent groups of buyers. One group is represented by
hospitals, which have a high demand elasticity (pharmaceuticals have to be paid out of their
budget) and can count on the advice of specialist doctors for an assessment of the competing
products. The other group is represented by the so-called 'community segment', where buyers
are general practitioners (GPs) who prescribe products for their patients (with the National
Health Service paying the bills), and who - not being experts - tend to choose those products
which have already been chosen by hospitals. This can be seen as an asymmetric two-sided
market, where hospitals mostly care about prices (and do not care about choices made by GPs),
while the demand of the community segment strongly depends on the choices made by hospitals.
6Comportamenti abusivi di Telecom Italia. Decision No. 13752, 16 November 2004.
7Internal documents showed TI's management was willing to incur losses in order to win - or win back -
important business customers.
8For instance, at Para. 275 of the Decision, a cable rival, Fastweb, argues that Telecom Italia's strategy aimed
at eliminating competitors' incentives to invest in new and non-recoverable alternative telecom infrastructure,
with the ultimate eect of inhibiting the development of competitors in the long-run.
9Decision of the Oce of Fair Trading No. CA98/01/2008 of 18 November 2008.
3As we shall discuss in Section 4.2, an incumbent like Napp may want to sell below costs to the
crucial side of the market (the hospital market in this case) to make sure the rival does not win
it, thereby deterring the rival's activity also in the other side of the market (in this case, the
community segment) - whose demand follows closely the choice made by hospitals. As a result,
the incumbent can behave like a monopolist on the community side of the market, recouping
any losses made to win the other (hospital) side.
Finally, in 2001, the European Commission found that Deutsche Post (DPAG) had abused
a dominant position in the market of mail order parcel services.10 The Commission argues that
by making use of predatory pricing and delity rebates, DPAG tried to prevent competitors in
the mail-order service from developing the infrastructure needed to compete successfully. The
idea that the incumbent's pricing policy aimed at depriving the rivals of economies of scale and
scope emerges clearly from the following quote (where 'cooperation partners' are customers with
very large orders):
"Contrary to what DPAG maintains, all of the disputed delity rebates are likely to have an eect on
the opportunities that other suppliers of mail-order parcel services have to compete. Successful entry
into the mail-order parcel services market requires a certain critical mass of activity (some 100 million
parcels or catalogues) and hence the parcel volumes of at least two cooperation partners in this eld.
By granting delity rebates to its biggest partners, DPAG has deliberately prevented competitors
from reaching the `critical mass' of some 100 million in annual turnover. This delity rebating policy
was, in precisely the period in which DPAG failed to cover its service-specic additional costs (1990
to 1995), a decisive factor in ensuring that the `tying eect' of the delity rebates for mail-order
parcel services maintained an inecient supply structure [...]." (Deutsche Post, para. 37)
Although not specied by the European Commission, one rationale for predation may have
been that, given the existence of important common costs with other postal services, mail-
order operators could later start to compete with other services of Deutsche Post.11 Hence, by
predating in the market which opened rst, Deutsche Post preserved its monopoly position in
all the markets where it operated. The application of our base model discussed in Section 2.2
ts the facts of the Deutsche Post case.
Let us close the introduction with a note on the related literature. Obviously, our paper
belongs to the literature on predatory pricing we have referred to above.12 The mechanism we
10European Commission Decision COMP/35.141 of 20 March 2001 ("Deutsche Post"). Published in the Ocial
Journal of the European Communities, OJ L 125/27 of 5 May 2001.
11For instance, Hermes Versand Service was initially created for the mail-order trade's own use, but its infras-
tructure was later used to convey parcels for third parties and in 2000 became one of the largest courier, express
mail and parcels operator in Germany. (See Deutsche Post, para. 38 and footnote 64)
12See also Cabral and Riordan (1994) for a duopoly model with learning by doing where the rm that made
larger sales in the past has an incentive to price aggressively to speed up learning and induce the rival's exit. In
their model rms face a sequence of buyers with uncertain demand and are ex-ante symmetric. The predatory
equilibrium is not necessarily welfare detrimental because quicker learning triggers lower production costs. A
model which rationalizes joint predation is Harrington (1989) where active rms coordinate in implementing a
policy of predatory prices in case of entry in order to sustain collusion in spite of the absence of high entry barriers.
In this case joint predation is a credible threat to discourage entry. Instead Argenton (2010) shows, in a model
where rms have increasing marginal costs, that some rms may coordinate on predatory prices in order to induce
exit of an existing rival and earn larger prots in the future.
4propose is a new one, which may help rationalize predation in particular cases where previous
theories may not apply. In other cases, however, our mechanism might well co-exist with other
rationales for predation. For instance, an incumbent may prey upon a rival in the initial stages
of a market, both as an attempt to deprive it of key prots (and thus to prevent it from enjoying
scale economies), and as a way to signal that it would behave aggressively in the future -
consistent with what suggested by incomplete information models. Further, our mechanism is
consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)'s nancial predation model: predation, by denying
prots to the rival, also reduces its assets, and therefore limits its access to outside funding.
Our paper is also very closely related to the more general literature on exclusion and may
be seen as an application of Bernheim and Whinston (1998) where inecient exclusion arises
due to the existence of contracting externalities that agents fail to internalize. In our case, the
agents who take their decisions in the early periods (the incumbent, the entrant and the early
buyers) do not internalize the payo of subsequent buyers, thereby nding it jointly protable
to exclude the more ecient entrant, even though exclusion reduces total welfare.
Contracting externalities are also at the basis of exclusion in Segal and Whinston (2000)
where, under the presence of multiple buyers and supply-side economies of scale, the incumbent
uses exclusive dealing contracts to deter ecient entry. An important dierence, though, is
that - in addition to the incumbency advantage which exists in our paper as well - in Segal and
Whinston (2000) the incumbent also enjoys a rst-mover advantage (i.e., it can make oers to
buyers before the entrant could materialize and make counter-oers), which facilitates exclusion.
Indeed, in the case where buyers are approached sequentially, where the timing of the game is the
closest to our model, entry deterrence does not require any sacrice of prots by the incumbent.
In our paper, instead, the incumbent needs to sell below cost to early buyers to achieve exclusion
(if the incumbent could make oers to buyers before the entrant materialised, exclusion without
prot sacrice would occur in our setting as well).13 More generally, our paper is also related
to models where exclusion occurs due to discriminatory oers. In this perspective, the main
reference is probably Innes and Sexton (1994)'s "divide and conquer" strategy, a more recent
paper being Karlinger and Motta (2007). Finally, the fact that exclusion takes place by depriving
the entrant, in early periods, of prots it needs to operate successfully in the long run makes
our exclusionary mechanism close also to Carlton and Waldman (2002)'s paper on exclusionary
tying in complementary markets.
13Another paper where exclusion may arise in the absence of a rst mover advantage is Gans and King (2002).
Dierently from our setting, suppliers are perfectly symmetric and their focus is on asymmetries in contracting
opportunities: there exist large buyers that can contract ex-ante with suppliers and small buyers - whose demand
is insucient for a supplier to reach ecient scale - that can only trade ex-post on a single price mass market.
In this environment, it is in the interest of large buyers to commit ex-ante to exclusivity with one supplier, to
prevent the rival supplier from achieving the ecient scale. This will stie competition in the mass market,
thereby allowing to extract more rents from small buyers. These rents are appropriated by large buyers through
the ex-ante contracting. Allocative ineciencies arise because small buyers pay a too high price, but there is no
exclusionary intent in suppliers' behaviour.
52 A simple model
In this Section, we introduce our basic model with supply-side scale economies. There are two
contestable buyers/markets, B1 and B2. Each of them demands one unit of a homogeneous
good for any price (weakly) lower than v.14
An incumbent rm (denoted as I) and a rival rm (denoted as R) compete for the two
buyers. We denote as Ci(qi) the total cost function of rm i = I;R, and we assume that rm R
is more ecient than the incumbent in producing the two contestable units (assumption A1),
but is less ecient if it produces only one unit (assumption A2):
CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) < CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI) (A1)
CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR) > CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI) (A2)
where qI > qR  0 denote the demand of some captive (i.e. non contestable) buyers/markets the
two rms may possibly supply. Captive buyers may be past customers who have arbitrarily high
switching costs and thus continue to buy from rm i, or buyers located in other geographical
areas where rm i is active and which are separated by arbitrarily high transportation costs, or
even past buyers whose choice aects present production costs, for instance due to learning-by-
doing eects. Note that we assume that rm I benets from an incumbency advantage: it has
been on the market for a longer period than the rival,15 or it has developed a more extended
activity in other geographical areas, which translates in a larger number of captive buyers than
the rival rm. Finally, we assume that v > CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR), and that CR(:) is strictly
concave over the two contestable units, while CI(:) is weakly concave.16
The fact that the rival is less ecient than the incumbent on the rst unit, in spite of being
more ecient on the entire production, results from the interaction between the incumbency
advantage discussed above and the existence of scale/scope economies. The fact the incum-
bent supplies a higher number of captive customers may allow it to better exploit scale/scope
economies and operate at lower incremental costs than the rival on the rst contestable unit.
Similarly, under learning-by-doing eects, an incumbent who has produced more in the past can
produce an additional unit at lower costs.
Finally, we assume that the two buyers are approached sequentially, the timing of the game
being as follows:
1. First period.
(a) Firms I;R simultaneously set prices p1
I and p1
R to buyer B1.
(b) B1 decides from whom to buy and the transaction takes place.
14The extension to n buyers would not create any conceptual diculty and would leave qualitative results un-
changed. The assumption of inelastic demands is also done for simplicity: the main dierence is that by assuming
elastic demands exclusion would entail not only a productive ineciency but also an allocative ineciency.
15A natural interpretation is that the incumbent is the former monopolist in markets that have been liberalized.
16Weak concavity of the incumbent's cost function simplies the exposition. Indeed, we could allow CI(qI) to
be 'moderately' convex so as to ensure that a rm is more ecient in producing its second unit than the rival
in producing its rst unit. This property follows directly from A1 and A2 when the incumbent cost function is
weakly concave.
62. Second period.
(a) Firms simultaneously set prices p2
I and p2
R to buyer B2.
(b) B2 decides from whom to buy and the transaction takes place.17
The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game are described by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Sequential - and discriminatory - oers) There exists a threshold level CP of
rm R's cost of producing the two units, with CP < CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI), such that:
 (Predation) If CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) > CP, then the incumbent supplies both buyers.
It sells below cost to the rst buyer, while recouping losses on the second: p1
I = e CR <
CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI), p2
I = CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR) > CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI).
 (Entry/Expansion) If CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR)  CP, then rm R supplies both buyers.
The price paid by the rst buyer is lower than the price paid by the second: p1
R = e CI <
CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI) = p2
R .
The threshold CP is (weakly) decreasing in qI:
Proof. Let us move by backward induction. Let us consider rst the subgame following B1
choosing the incumbent. Standard Bertrand competition for the second buyer takes place, with
the incumbent's cost to supply B2 being lower than the rival's:
CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI + 1)  CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI) < CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR); (1)
the rst inequality following from weak concavity of CI(:) and the second from assumption A2.
Hence, the incumbent serves the second buyer, at a price p2
I = CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR). (Here,
and in what follows, we disregard equilibria in weakly dominated strategies.)
Let us consider now the subgame following B1 choosing the rival. In this case the rival's cost
to supply B2 is lower than the incumbent's cost:
CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR + 1) < CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI + 1)  CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI); (2)
the rst inequality following from assumptions A1 and A2, the second from weak concavity of
CI(:). Hence, it is the rival that supplies the second buyer, at a price p2
R = CI(qI +1) CI(qI).
Let us move to competition for the rst buyer. Each rm anticipates that, by securing the
rst buyer, it will be able to supply also the second, thereby obtaining a total prot equal to:
i = p1
i + p2
i   (Ci(qi + 2)   Ci(qi)) (3)
with i = R;I. We can thus denote as e Ci = Ci(qi + 2)   Ci(qi)   p2
i , with i = I;R, each rm's
'adjusted' cost to supply the rst buyer, which corresponds to the total cost of producing the
two units diminished by the rents extracted from the second buyer. Note that, by assumption
A2, the incumbent extracts more rents than the rival from the second buyer (i.e. p2
I > p2
R ).
Hence, even though the rival is more ecient than the incumbent in producing the two units, it
17The results of the analysis would not change if both transactions took place at the end of the second period.
7is not necessarily the case that its 'adjusted' cost is lower. More precisely, e CR  e CI if and only
if:
CR(qR+2) CR(qR)  CI(qI +2) CI(qI) [CR(qR+1) CR(qR) (CI(qI +1) CI(qI))]  CP
(4)
with CP < CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI) by assumption A2.
It follows that when CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) > CP, the incumbent secures B1 and sells at a
price p1
I = e CR. If instead CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR)  CP, rm R secures B1 and sells at a price
p1
R = e CI.
Note that:
p1
I = e CR = CR(qR+2) CR(qR) [CI(qI+1) CI(qI)] < CI(qI+2) CI(qI+1)  CI(qI+1) CI(qI)
(5)
the rst inequality following from assumption A1 and the second from weak concavity of CI(:).
Also:
p1
R = e CI = CI(qI+2) CI(qI) [CR(qR+1) CR(qR)] < CI(qI+2) CI(qI+1)  CI(qI+1) CI(qI)
(6)
the rst inequality following from assumption A2 and the second from weak concavity of CI(:).
Weak concavity of CI(:) also implies that the threshold CP is weakly decreasing in qI.
Proposition 1 shows that - if the rival's cost advantage in producing both units is not too
large - the game admits a unique equilibrium where exclusion of the (ecient) rm takes place
due to a predatory strategy by the incumbent. Indeed, the incumbent sets a price below its
own marginal costs of production in the rst period of the game, therefore making losses on
buyer B1, to increase its price in the second period, therefore recouping its previous losses. The
usual ingredients for predation, namely early prot sacrice and subsequent recoupment, are
thus present in this simple model.
Note that the exclusionary equilibrium arises even though the incumbent does not enjoy a
rst-mover advantage and the rival can submit bids at the same time as the incumbent. The
source of exclusion is the interaction between the existence of scale/scope economies and the
incumbency advantage enjoyed by rm I, which implies that the rival is less ecient than the
incumbent in producing only one unit. Because of this, when it has already secured the rst
buyer, the incumbent is able to charge a price to the second buyer which is higher than the price
that the rival is able to establish for B2 when it has secured B1. The expectation of higher rent
extraction from the second buyer - ceteris paribus - will make the incumbent more aggressive
when competing for the rst buyer, an eect which may dominate the fact that the rival is more
ecient overall and result in inecient exclusion.18
Note also that, from the last item of Proposition 1, the stronger the incumbency advantage
- as captured by an increase in the number of the incumbent's captive buyers qI - the more
18If the incumbent also enjoys a rst-mover advantage exclusion will be easier. This is because the incumbent
can take actions to attract the early buyer before the entrant can react, and can therefore exploit in the most
protable way the negative externality that the rst buyer exerts on the other when it decides to buy from the
incumbent.
8likely the predatory equilibrium. This is because a larger qI makes the incumbent (weakly)
more ecient in producing any of the two units. This, ceteris paribus, reduces the incumbent's
overall cost disadvantage and limits the rival's rents extraction, thereby making it easier for the
incumbent to win competition for B1.
Finally, the above interaction may arise in situations where the rival is a potential entrant
(like the one discussed in the application of Section 2.1) as well as in situations where the rival
is already in the market and aims at expanding its activity by competing for new contestable
units. Hence, this model predicts that the incumbent may adopt predatory pricing to deter
entry but also to discipline a rival relegating it to a niche role.
2.1 Application 1: entry deterrence
In this section we illustrate a specic situation where the predation mechanism highlighted in
Section 2 may arise. Imagine that rms' unit variable costs are constant, with cR = 0 < cI, and
that entering the market requires a xed sunk cost f, with f < v. Firm I has already supplied
past buyers (i.e. qI > 0) and thus has already sunk the entry cost f when competition for the
rst buyer/market takes place, while rm R is a new entrant (i.e. qR = 0) and has not. The
timing of the game is the same as the one described in Section 2, with the addition of an explicit
entry decision for rm R at the end of each period (and with the transaction with rm E taking
place after the entry decision). In this environment:
CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) = CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR) = f (7)
CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI) = CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI + 1) = cI (8)
Hence, assumptions A1 and A2 translate into:
cI < f < 2cI (9)
Lemma 1. Equilibria of this game are as follows:
 (Predation) If f > 3cI=2, then rm R and I set p1
1 = p1
R = f   cI < cI, the rst buyer
buys from I, entry in the rst period does not occur, rm R and I set p2
R = p2
I = f; the
second buyer buys from I and entry in the second period does not occur.
 (Entry) If f  3cI=2, then rm R and I set p1
R = p1
I = 2cI   f < cI, the rst buyer buys
from R, entry occurs, rm R and I set p2
R = p2
I = cI, the second buyer buys from R.
Proof. Direct application of Proposition 1.
This scenario resembles markets where buyers decide on the basis of tender oers (such as pub-
lic/private procurement markets), or where buyers are large business customers which negotiate
prices with their suppliers, and where carrying out the entry investment takes time - think for
instance of a situation where such an investment consists of building a large and complex infras-
tructure, carrying out construction work, obtaining licenses or working permits. In such cases it
may be that the rst market materializes and tender oers are solicited before the new entrant
has had the time (or the ability) to sink (most of the) entry costs or to credibly commit to them.
Examples of sectors which immediately come to mind are telecommunications, transportation,
construction.
92.2 Application 2: scope economies
Another possible interpretation of the setting presented in Section 2, is that the two contestable
buyers are each a buyer of a dierent product and that there are economies from joint production.
In that case the cost functions could be reinterpreted as total cost functions of the two products,
and the interaction between scope economies and incumbency advantage would lead us to rewrite
assumptions A1 and A2 as:
CR(qR1 + 1;qR2 + 1)   CR(qR1;qR2) < CI(qI1 + 1;qI2 + 1)   CI(qI1;qI2) ( ~ A1)
CR(qR1;qR2 + 1)   CR(qR1;qR2) > CI(qI1;qI2 + 1)   CI(qI1;qI2) ( ~ A2)
It is easy to show that the main results of our model carry over to this revised setting: the
incumbent may predate in the rst market to preserve its dominant position in the other market.
Similarly, predation may arise if in the rst period the rival can enter only in the market
for product 1, while in the second period entry is allowed in both product markets. This may
have been the case in some recently liberalized markets, such as postal services, where new
entry is allowed in some segments of the market (mail-order parcel services, business-to-business
mail), while the former public monopolist keeps a 'reserved area' for some period after the
liberalization;19 or it may be the case where taris or other barriers to trade are being phased
out at dierent speeds in dierent markets, so that a new rm might be able to enter some
markets immediately, but will be able to enter a particular foreign market only in the future.
Hence, present scope economies and an incumbency advantage, predatory pricing may arise
in the market which open rst, to preserve the incumbent's dominant position across all the
markets where it is active.20
3 Discussion
In this Section, we discuss which assumptions behind the model drive the predation result. We
also study welfare eects.
3.1 Intertemporal discriminatory pricing v. uniform pricing
We have assumed that buyers can be charged dierent prices across periods, thus allowing for
intertemporal price discrimination. If rms were instead obliged to charge the same price to all
buyers, then predation would never occur. Intuitively, the incumbent has an incentive to price
aggressively and suer losses on the rst buyer only if it can recoup such losses on the later
buyer. Under intertemporal uniform pricing, instead, if the incumbent wanted to cut prices, it
would have to do so for all buyers. Then, it will never want to sell at a common price p = p1
I = p2
I
below [CI(qI +2) CI(qI)]=2 and, by assumption A1, it would not be able to exclude the rival.
19See Deutsche Post, where DP had exclusive rights to carry letters and items weighing less than 200 g.
20Also Carlton and Waldman (2002) shows that, in markets related by complementarity in consumption rather
than by the existence of common costs, the incumbent can deter entry in the market which opens rst in order to
protect its dominant position in all the markets where it operates. Note, however, that in the supply-side version
of their model, successful exclusion requires the incumbent to enjoy also a rst-mover advantage and to adopt
irreversible tying.
103.2 Consumer surplus and welfare
The case of (intertemporal) uniform pricing provides us with the natural benchmark for welfare
analysis. Indeed, if the incumbent was not allowed to behave strategically so as to exclude,
that is, if (intertemporal) price discrimination was forbidden, the unique equilibrium would
be the one where the more ecient producer supplies both buyers at a total price equal to
p1 + p2 = CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI).
Thus predation harms consumers, as the total price paid by the two buyers is
p1
I + p2
I = e CR + CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR) > CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI) (10)
precisely when e CR > e CI, i.e. when CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) > CP and predation takes place.
The predatory equilibrium is also welfare-inferior as the two buyers are supplied at a higher
cost, thereby entailing a productive ineciency. Obviously, with any downward-sloping demand
function in addition to the productive ineciency the exclusionary equilibrium would also entail
a deadweight loss.
Note, however, that policy implications are less straightforward than they may appear at rst
sight. Banning (intertemporal) price discrimination does not unambiguously increase consumer
surplus. In fact, if CR(qR +2) CR(qR)  CP (i.e. if predation does not occur at equilibrium),
then allowing for price discrimination induces the suppliers to compete intensively for the rst




R = CI(qI+2) CI(qI) [CR(qR+1) CR(qR)]+CI(qI+1) CI(qI) < CI(qI+2) CI(qI)
(11)
by assumption A2. Since rm R supplies both buyers anyhow, total welfare would be equal under
price discrimination and under uniform pricing, but this is just because of inelastic demands. If
we assumed elastic demands, total welfare would also be higher under price discrimination.21
Measures aimed at discouraging price aggressiveness by dominant rms, for instance for-
bidding them from discriminating across customers or from selling below cost, would therefore
result in a trade-o. On the one hand, they would reduce the chances that anti-competitive
exclusion would take place; on the other hand, when the entrant is suciently more ecient
than the incumbent, they would chill competition and result in higher prices.
3.3 Simultaneous oers
A crucial ingredient in our model is that price oers to buyers are made sequentially. If the game
was modied so that rms bid simultaneously for both buyers and then buyers simultaneously
choose the supplier, exclusion might arise, but only if buyers suer from coordination failures.22
Consider, for instance, a situation where the incumbent oers a price p1
I = p2
I = CR(qR + 1)  
CR(qR) and both buyers buy from it. If a buyer expects the other to choose the incumbent, it has
21Forbidding below-cost pricing would lead to similar conclusions. In such a case rm R would supply both




R = CI(qI + 1)   CI(qI): Hence, when predation does not take
place anyway, the rst buyer pays a higher price while the second buyer pays the same price as in the case where
below-cost pricing is feasible.
22On this, see Fumagalli and Motta (2008).
11no incentive to address rm R - even if it oers a lower price - because it anticipates that rm R's
cost to produce its unit alone exceeds the oered price, and that rm R would thus prefer not to
serve the deviant buyer. Note that the mechanism behind exclusion is completely dierent from
the one identied in Section 2. For this reason, when it relies on coordination failures, pricing
below costs is not necessary for exclusion. Indeed, a continuum of prices (including below-cost
pricing to one buyer) can arise at equilibrium, each one supported by appropriate continuation
equilibria concerning buyers' decisions.
If, instead, bids are simultaneous but buyers choose sequentially - so as to rule out coordina-
tion failures - exclusion will not arise at the equilibrium. The intuition is that the fact that prices
for both buyers are set simultaneously expands the scope for protable deviations with respect
to the case of sequential bids. Consider, for instance, the price oers indicated in Proposition
1. Since p1
I + p2
I > CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI), then rm R has an incentive to slightly undercut both
prices: absent coordination failures, this would attract both buyers and would allow rm R to
make positive prots. In order to block the rival's deviations the incumbent should bid a pair
of prices such that p1
I + p2
I  CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) but such an oer would not be protable
for the incumbent by assumption A1. For a similar reason, however, equilibria where buyers are
supplied by rm R - when they exist - exhibit prices p1
R = p2
R = e CI < CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI + 1)
for both buyers, as both prices must be immune to the incumbent's deviation of undercutting on
one buyer and recouping (i.e. setting p = CR(qR + 1)   CR(qR)) on the other.
3.4 Strategic buyers
In our model, buyers cannot coordinate their decisions and have to buy at exogenously given
times. In this Section, we discuss what would happen if we relaxed these assumptions. Trivially,
if buyers could decide jointly, then predation would not take place. In terms of Bernheim and
Whinston's logic, inecient exclusion could not occur because all agents would be represented
in the negotiation. For instance, if the second buyer could ask the rst buyer to purchase on
its behalf as well, then the rst buyer could buy two units and rm R would serve both buyers.
Similarly, if the rst buyer did not incur a loss in delaying its purchase and both buyers could
jointly decide in the second period. In both cases, though, the rst buyer will want to receive
at least the same surplus as when decisions are decentralised, since it benets from competition
between suppliers in the rst period.
Consider now the case where buyers take independent decisions and cannot contract among
them, but are free to choose when to buy. Clearly, the rst buyer would have no incentive to
postpone its purchase because it obtains a higher surplus when buying rst. However, the second
buyer - if it could - would have an incentive to anticipate its purchase and be the rst. Buyers
will therefore engage in a race to be the rst one to buy. If there was an initial date before
which purchases were not possible, both buyers would buy at that date. We would therefore be
back to the simultaneous moves case we discussed above, with exclusion which could take place
because of miscoordination.
There is no general answer to the question of which of the settings discussed above would
prevail in reality. Institutional features or legal constraints may explain the prevalence of a
situation over another. For instance, the liberalisation process may be designed in such a way
that a market would open before another, the existence of a patent may determine why a
12market may become contestable after another, bureaucratic rules may delay public procurement
determining dierent purchase periods, nancial constraints may delay purchase decisions of
some consumers, and so on.
3.5 Growing markets
In this Section we relax the assumption that the two buyers/markets have equal size, and assume,
instead, that the second buyer is larger than the rst one. This may reect situations where the
product is new and demand is expected to grow over time, or where rms' time horizon expands
and they expect demand to arise for a higher number of future periods (that we collapse into
period 2). Let us assume that buyers' demands are, respectively, 1   k units for B1 and 1 + k
units for B2, with k 2 [0;1].
A rst implication of this type of asymmetry is that inecient exclusion cannot arise at
equilibrium if the second buyer/market is large enough. To see why, consider that a necessary
condition for (inecient) exclusion is that the 1 + k units are insucient for the rival to reach
the ecient scale and produce more eciently than the incumbent:
CR(qR + 1 + k)   CR(qR) > CI(qI + 1 + k)   CI(qI); (A2')
that is what allows the incumbent to extract more rents than rm R from the second buyer,
once secured the rst one, which in turn is necessary for the incumbent to have an incentive to
bid more aggressively for B1. When k = 1, the above condition cannot be satised as it would
contradict assumption A1, which ensures that rm R is more ecient than the incumbent on the
entire production and thus that exclusion (if any) is welfare detrimental. Instead, by assumption
A2, the above condition is satised when k = 0 and buyers are symmetric. By continuity, there
exists a critical size of the second buyer 1+ k such that the above condition does not hold and
thus inecient exclusion cannot arise if the size of the second buyer is above the threshold level.
Instead, when condition A20 is satised, following the same logic of Section 2, one can easily
show that predatory pricing and inecient exclusion take place if (and only if) rm R's cost
advantage is not too large, i.e. i CR(qR + 2)   CR(qR) > CP(k) where
CP(k)  CI(qI + 2)   CI(qI)   [CR(qR + 1 + k)   CR(qR)   (CI(qI + 1 + k)   CI(qI))]: (12)
Note that, without imposing specic restrictions on the slope of the cost functions, one cannot
tell whether inecient exclusion becomes more or less likely as buyers' asymmetry increases,
i.e. as k increases. Indeed, an expansion of the second buyer's demand allows both suppliers
to extract more rents from B2, once secured B1, thereby inducing a more aggressive bidding
for the rst buyer by both suppliers. The only possible claim is that for values of k suciently
close to k the threshold CP(k) is increasing in k, and thus exclusion becomes less likely as the
second period demand expands.23
23It is easy to show that in the particular example of entry deterrence examined in Section 2.1, predation is
unambiguously more dicult as k increases.
133.6 Downstream competition
We have assumed so far that buyers are nal consumers. This is not necessarily an innocent
assumption in exclusionary models, as showed by Fumagalli and Motta (2006, 2008). When
buyers are rms that are competing in a downstream market, we cannot assume any longer that
the number of units they buy from their chosen supplier is xed. In particular, consider the
case where downstream markets are fully integrated, buyers are retailers and are perceived as
homogeneous by nal consumers. Then, the buyer-retailer who pays the lower wholesale price
will be able to dominate the entire downstream market. In turn, this means that the incumbent
cannot protably exclude rm R.24 The intuition is that even if the rst buyer has committed
to buy from the incumbent at a certain wholesale price, the rival rm may guarantee itself
enough scale to operate more eciently than I by selling to the second buyer at a slightly lower
price. Hence, even though the incumbent secured the rst buyer, rm R does not suer any
disadvantage when competing for B2 and the incumbent cannot extract more rents than rm R
from the second buyer. In turn, this implies that the incumbent has no incentive to bid more
aggressively than rm R for the rst buyer. On top of this, when competition is so erce, the
incumbent cannot recoup losses if it sells below-cost to the rst buyer, as it cannot make prots
by selling to the second buyer at a suciently large price. As long as w2 > w1, it is the rst buyer
who dominates the downstream market and the incumbent would sell its entire production to it.
For these reasons, predation does not occur if there is suciently erce downstream competition.
If, instead, dowsntream rms are highly dierentiated, or operate in independent markets (i.e.
downstream competition is absent or weak), then the predatory outcome would continue to arise
(as long as the rival cost advantage is not too large): each buyer could bring only a limited share
of the total market to rm R, and if the incumbent managed to win the rst buyer, the second
buyer's order alone would no suce for the rival to reach ecient scale.
3.7 Renegotiation
In the predatory equilibrium both buyers choose the incumbent even though the rival could
supply the two units at lower costs. This raises the question of whether the predatory equi-
librium would survive to the possibility of renegotiating the buyers' decisions. In our model,
where transactions take place immediately each buyer's decision, renegotiation is impossible.
Also in a context where transactions take place only after the choice of both buyers, there might
be little scope for renegotiation. For instance, renegotiation might require some form of agree-
ment/coordination between suppliers and anti-trust laws might prohibit or impose restrictions
to this type of behaviour. Alternatively, renegotiation costs might be high because breaching
the initial decision may involve substantial legal costs or because of the costs of delaying con-
sumption and production until a new agreement is reached. In an environment where, instead,
transactions take place after the choice of both buyers and renegotiation costs are suciently
low, an equilibrium where both buyers choose the incumbent might still arise - sustained by
the incumbent's ability to extract part of the gain from renegotiation - but it would not involve
exclusion of the more ecient supplier.
24Proof available from the authors upon request.
144 Demand-side scale economies
In this Section we show that the mechanism identied in Section 2 may rationalize predation also
when scale economies arise from the demand side and are due to network externalities (Section
4.1) or multi-sided market externalities (Section 4.2).
4.1 Network Externalities
Assume that the incumbent and the rival are equally ecient in producing two dierentiated and
incompatible network products, and have a constant unit cost equal to c. Each manufacturer has
an installed base of customers bi with i = I;R, i.e. old customers who are not buying any longer,
but continue to use the network product. Also in this case we assume that the incumbent enjoys
an incumbency advantage and can rely on a larger customer base than the rival: bI > bR  0.
There are two new buyers, B1 and B2, who enjoy utility Ui = vi(ni)   pi if they buy one
unit of the network product from rm i = I;R, where ni 2 N+ indicates the total number of
users (including present and past buyers). There are direct network externalities in that the
utility enjoyed by a user of network i increases with the total number of users of that network:
v
0
i(ni)  0. Even if not necessary for our results, we also assume that v
00
i (ni)  0. Finally,
similarly to the analysis of Section 2, we assume that the combination of network externalities
and the incumbency advantage results in the following feature: even though at full size (i.e.
when both of the new buyers add to it) the quality of the rival's network is superior to the
incumbent's (assumption A1), with only one new buyer the quality of rm R's product is
inferior (assumption A2):
vR(bI + 2) > vI(bI + 2) (A1*)
vI(bI + 1) > vR(bR + 1) (A2*)
The game is as follows.
1. First period.
(a) Firms I;R simultaneously set prices p1
I and p1
R to the rst buyer. (b) B1 decides from
whom to buy.
2. Second period.
(a) Firms I;R simultaneously set prices p2
I and p2
R to the second buyer. (b) B2 decides
from whom to buy.
3. Third period.
Consumption takes place and utilities are realized.
The following Proposition shows that also in this case - if the quality gap between the rival's
and the incumbent's network at full size is not too large - by pricing below cost the incumbent
can exclude the more ecient supplier. The intuition behind this result is similar to the case of
supply side scale economies. Competition for the rst buyer will be particularly intense because
who secures the rst buyer will supply also the second. The fact that at full size the quality
of the rival's network is superior represents an advantage for rm R when competing for B1.
15However the fact that one buyer is insucient for rm R to reach ecient scale may allow the
incumbent to extract more rents than the rival from the second buyer which - ceteris paribus -
makes the incumbent more aggressive when competing for B1. When this latter eect dominates,
the incumbent secures the rst buyer and excludes the more ecient rival.25 Similarly to the
model with supply-side scale economies, also in this case the stronger the incumbency advantage
- i.e. the higher bI - the more likely predation to arise at the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. There exists a threshold level vP of the utility of rm R's network, with vP >
vI(bI + 2) such that:
 (Predation) If vR(bR + 2) < vP, then the incumbent supplies both buyers. It sells below
cost to the rst buyer, while recouping on the second buyer: p1
I = ~ cR   [vR(bR + 2)  
vI(bI + 2)] < c and p2
I = c + vI(bI + 2)   vR(bR + 1) > c.
 (Entry/Expansion) If vR(bR + 2)  vP, then rm R supplies both buyers. The price
paid by the rst buyer is lower than the price paid by the second: p1
R = ~ cI +[vR(bR +2) 
vI(bI + 2)] < c + vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 1) = p2
R .
The threshold vP is (weakly) increasing in bI.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A distinction with the case of supply-side scale economies that is worth emphasizing is that,
under network externalities, exclusion of the more ecient producer is not necessarily welfare
detrimental. The reason is that old customers, who are still using the incumbent's product,
benet when the new buyers join the incumbent's network. Their welfare gain may be large
enough to dominate both the eciency loss associated to the fact that new buyers use the inferior
product and the loss suered by the old customers of the rival due to the lack of expansion of
their network. When this is the case, i.e. when
bI[vI(bI + 2)   vI(bI)] > 2[vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 2)] + bR[vR(bR + 2)   vR(bR)] (13)
predatory pricing excludes the more ecient producer but is welfare benecial.
In a similar vein, it may be that the incumbent excludes a less ecient rival but this is
welfare detrimental. Consider the case where rm R's network is inferior even at full size. The
incumbent will always secure both buyers because not only more favourable rent extraction but
also superior quality of the own network make it a stronger competitor. Also, the incumbent
does not necessarly need to price below cost in order to exclude the rival. Still exclusion of the
inecient producer may be welfare detrimental. This is the case when the welfare loss suered
by the old customers of the rival, who fail to experience an expansion in their network, dominates
both the eciency gain due to new buyers using the higher quality product and the welfare gain
25Also in Carlton and Waldman (2002) - in the variant based on network externalities - the rst cohort of
consumers is the key one and competition for it may result in exclusion of the more ecient entrant. In their
case, though, it is the fact that the incumbent is already active in the market for a complementary product to the
network product that makes it more aggressive in bidding for the rst cohort of customers. In turn, this occurs
because the incumbent extracts the entire surplus generated by the system, if it dominates the market for the
network product, while it is only partially able to do so if the entrant dominates such a market.
16of the incumbent's old customers. Note that this situation is more likely to arise when the size
of the incumbent's network is large enough to exhaust the externality generated by additional
users. In such a case society may benet from the expansion of an alternative, though inferior,
network and exclusion of the less ecient supplier may be welfare detrimental.
4.2 Two-sided markets
In this Section we consider the case where each rm (or platform) can sell its product to two
dierent groups of consumers, each group (or side of the market) beneting from positive exter-
nalities from the number of users on the other side. We assume that a consumer on side k and
using product i will receive a utility Uki = vki(nli)   pki, with k;l = 1;2;k 6= l, i = I;R, with
nli being the total number of users (both old and new buyers) of platform i on side l and with
v
0
ki(nli)  0. Platforms are incompatible.
The incumbent and the rival have a constant unit cost c. Each platform has an installed
base of old customers bki with k = 1;2, i = I;R, who are not buying any longer, but continue
to use the product. For simplicity, we assume that a given platform has the same customer base
on each side: b1I = b2I = bI and b1R = b2R = bR, with the incumbency advantage amounting to
bI > bR  0. We also assume that v1i() = v2i() = vi(), with i = I;R.
When the game starts, there are two new buyers, B1 and B2, one on each side of the market,
who are taking purchase decisions sequentially.
Finally, similarly to the previous sections, we assume that the rival is overall more ecient
but it has an initial disadvantage:
vR(bR + 1) > vI(bI + 1) (A1^)
vI(bI) > vR(bR) (A2^)
The game is the usual one, with rms rst competing for B1 and then for B2.
The following can be showed:




P > vI(bI + 1) such that:
 (Predation) If vR(bR + 1) < v
0
P, then the incumbent supplies both buyers. It sells below
cost to the rst buyer, while recouping on the second buyer: p1
I = ~ cR   [vR(bR + 1)  
vI(bI + 1)] < c and p2
I = c + vI(bI + 1)   vR(bR) > c.
 (Entry/Expansion) If vR(bR + 1)  v
0
P, then rm R supplies both buyers. The price
paid by the rst buyer is lower than the price paid by the second: p1
R = ~ cI +[vR(bR +1) 




P is weakly increasing in bI.
Proof. See Appendix B.
An application of this model can be used to rationalize the NAPP case briey described in the
introduction.26 In that case, rms were selling to hospitals (our side-1) and to the community
26Another case involving a two-sided market is Aberdeen Journals case (Decision of the Director General of
Fair Trading No. CA98/14/2002 of 16 September 2002. Upheld by Competition Appeal Tribunal in CAse No.
1009/1/1/02 of 23 June 2003.
17segment (side-2). While hospitals' utility was not inuenced by decision in the community
segment, community decisions were heavily aected by hospitals'. In terms of our model, we
would have v1i() = vi while v2i(n1i).
5 Conclusions
We have presented a simple theory of predation which is based on the presence of scale economies
(either on the supply- or the demand-side). The prey would need to reach a certain scale
of operations in order to be viable. Knowing this, the incumbent-predator would have an
incentive to incur losses on early buyers (or markets), so as to deprive the prey of the scale it
needs, thus reducing competition on later buyers (or markets), where the incumbent could then
make higher prots. Consistent with the standard description of predatory pricing, our model
predicts that in an exclusionary (predatory) equilibrium, a prot sacrice phase is followed by
a recoupment phase. This equilibrium exists only if scale economies are suciently important
and the incumbent is not too inecient (at full scale) relative to the entrant.
Our paper provides competition agencies with a new theory of harm in predation cases,
and helps them identify situations where it is possible that predation based on this mechanism
may arise. An agency who believes that the present theory might apply to a given case should
necessarily show that the following factors co-exist in the industry:
 economies of scale (whether due to xed costs, learning eects, demand externalities or
other reason) are important;
 there are strong incumbency advantages, which may be proxied by the current market
share of the incumbent: note that the higher the proportion of captive buyers (or the
larger the established base) of the incumbent relative to the rival the more likely that
predation will occur. Also, note that incumbency advantages are reinforced by switching
costs and by the infrequency of purchases;
 buyer power is weak (if few buyers command a large percentage of orders, or if they
coordinate their purchases, they will internalise the externality which is at the basis of the
exclusionary mechanism described here);
 downstream competition is weak;
 intertemporal price discrimination is possible;
 the market is suciently mature, in the sense that a rapidly growing market is one where
the number of contestable buyers will be larger relative to the captive ones, making it
easier for the prey to reach minimum ecient scale.
We have argued that in some recent predation cases pursued by EU antitrust agencies, our
exclusionary mechanism might oer an economic rationale for predation.
We do not claim that our predation theory replaces or generalises the traditional theories
of predation. In some cases, predation might be more likely motivated by the desire of an
incumbent to build a reputation for aggressive behaviour or by the attempt of a well-funded
18dominant rm to make it more dicult for a new rm to obtain external funds. But in other
cases, our scale-economies mechanism might t the evidence better. Further, these rationales
might co-exist: our theory does not exclude that an incumbent might want to deprive an actual
entrant of the scale it needs while at the same time sending a message to other potential entrants
that it is ready to do the same in the future; and being aggressive to an entrant to deprive it of
the prots it needs might have the eect of reducing the entrant's assets, and therefore making
it more dicult for it to obtain funds in an imperfect capital market.27
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let us move by backward induction. The outcome of competition for the second buyer,
B2, depends on the choice made by the rst one. Let us consider rst the subgame following
B1 choosing the incumbent. From assumption A2 and from vI(ni) being (weakly) increasing in
the total number of users, it follows that the quality of the incumbent's network when B2 joins
is superior to the quality of the rival's network when B2 joins:
vI(bI + 2)  vI(bI + 1) > vR(bR + 1) (14)
Hence, in order to attract B2, the rival should discount the incumbent's price by an amount equal
to the quality gap between the two network products: p2
R < p2
I [vI(bI+2) vR(bR+1)]. Bertrand
competition results in the incumbent serving B2 at a price p2
I = c + vI(bI + 2)   vR(bR + 1).
20If, instead, B1 chose the rival, from assumption A1 and from v
0
I(ni)  0, it follows that for
the second buyer the quality of the rival's network is superior to the incumbent's:
vR(bR + 2) > vI(bI + 2)  vI(bI + 1) (15)
In this case it is the incumbent that suers a competitive disadvantage and must oer a discount
in order to attract B2: p2
I < p2
R  [vR(bR +2) vI(bI +1)]. In equilibrium, the rival supplies the
second buyer at a price p2
R = c + vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 1).
Let us move to the rst period. Agents anticipate that the second buyer will follow the choice
of the rst one. Hence, B1 is willing to address the incumbent if (and only if) vI(bI +2) p1
I >
vR(bR+2) p1
R. By assumption A1, at full size the rival's network exhibits higher quality than
the incumbent's. This represents a disadvantage for the incumbent when competing for B1 and
calls for a discount relative to rm R's price in order to win B1: p1
I < p1
R [vR(bR+2) vI(bI+2)].
However, the supplier who wins the rst buyer will win also the second, thereby obtaining a
total prot equal to:
i = p1
i + p2
i   2c (16)
with i = I;R. We can thus denote as ~ ci = 2c p2
i = c [vi(bi+2) vj(bj +1)] with i 6= j = I;R
each rm's 'adjusted cost' to supply the rst buyer, which corresponds to the total cost to
supply the two buyers diminished by the rents extracted from the second one. Note that, even
though higher quality at full size favours rents extraction by the rival, the fact that one buyer
is insucient for rm R to achieve ecient scale is favourable to the incumbent. If the latter
eect is suciently strong, the incumbent extracts more rents than the rival from the second
buyer and may manage to win the rst buyer despite the discount it has to oer. This is the
case if (and only if):
~ cI < ~ cR   [vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 2)] (17)
which is equivalent to
vR(bR + 2) < vI(bI + 2) +
vI(bI + 1)   vR(bR + 1)
2
 vP (18)
with vP > vI(bI + 2) by assumption A2.
It follows that when vR(bR + 2) < vP, the incumbent wins B1 and sells at a price p1
I =
~ cR   [vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 2)] = c   [vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 1)]   [vR(bR + 2)   vI(bI + 2)] < c
by assumptions A1. If instead vR(bR + 2)  vP, then rm R secures B1 and sells at a price
p1
R = ~ cI +[vR(bR +2) vI(bI +2)] = c [vI(bI +2) vR(bR +1)]+[vR(bR +2) vI(bI +2)].
B Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Proceed by backward induction and consider the second period. (a) If in the rst period
B1 bought from I, then B2's utility from buying from I and from R respectively will be: U2I =
vI(bI + 1)   p2
I and U2R = vR(bR)   p2
R. Note that B2 enjoys the additional benet from one
extra user on side-1 if she buys from I, but not from R. From assumption A2^ and from vI(ni)
being (weakly) increasing in the total number of users, it follows that in order to attract B2
21the rival must oer a suciently large discount as compared to the incumbent's price: p2
R <
p2
I   [vI(bI + 1)   vR(bR)]. Bertrand competition results in the incumbent serving B2 at a price
p2
I = c+vI(bI +1) vR(bR). (b) If in the rst period B1 bought from R, then B2's utility from
buying from I and from R respectively will be: U2I = vI(bI)   p2
I and U2R = vR(bR + 1)   p2
R.
This time, B2 enjoys the additional benet from one extra user on side-1 if she buys from R.
From assumption A1^ and from v
0
I(ni)  0, it follows that it is the incumbent that suers a
competitive disadvantage and must oer s discount to attract B2: p2
I < p2
R [vR(bR+1) vI(bI)].
In equilibrium, the rival supplies B2 at a price p2
R = c + vR(bR + 1)   vI(bI).
Consider now competition for B1. Agents anticipate that the second buyer will follow the
choice of the rst one. Hence, B1 is willing to buy from the incumbent if (and only if) vI(bI +
1)   p1
I > vR(bR + 1)   p1
R. By assumption A1^, overall eciency represents an advantage for
rm R when competing for B1 and the incumbent must oer a discount relative to rm R's
price in order to win B1: p1
I < p1
R [vR(bR + 1)   vI(bI + 1)]. However, the platform that serves
the side-1 buyer will also serve the side-2 buyer, thereby making total prots i = p1
i +p2
i  2c,
with i = I;R. Also in this case we can denote as ~ ci = 2c   p2
i = c   [vi(bi + 1)   vj(bj)], with
i 6= j = I;R, each rm's 'adjusted cost' to supply the rst buyer. Again, higher overall ecienct
favours rents extraction by the rival, but the initial advantage is favourable to the incumbent.
If the latter eect is suciently strong, the incumbent extracts more rents than the rival from
the second buyer and may manage to win the rst buyer despite the discount it has to oer.
This is the case if (and only if):
~ cI < ~ cR   [vR(bR + 1)   vI(bI + 1)] (19)
which is equivalent to








P > vI(bI + 1) by assumption A2^.
Then, when vR(bR + 1) < v
0
P, platform I wins competition for B1 and sells at a price
p1
I = ~ cR  [vR(bR +1) vI(bI +1)] = c [vR(bR +1) vI(bI)] [vR(bR +1) vI(bI +1)] < c by
assumptions A1^. When instead vR(bR + 1)  v
0
P it will be platform R which obtains B1, with
p1
R = ~ cI + [vR(bR + 1)   vI(bI + 1)] = c   [vI(bI + 1)   vR(bR)] + [vR(bR + 1)   vI(bI + 1)].
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